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INTRODUCTION
Prior to April 18, 1997, Marcus Wayman lived a life typical of a
high school senior. He was set to graduate from Minersville Area
High School in about a month.' He was an athlete-a member of his
high school football team. 2 Wayman's life took a tragic turn on April
18, however, when he walked into his home, located the keys to the
family's gun cabinet, removed a revolver, and shot himself in the
face.3 His suicide note read: "I'm sorry grandpa, I found my future. I
won't let everyone's life be ruined by mine."
4
The circumstances surrounding the death of Marcus Wayman are
as shocking as they are tragic. Earlier that evening, in the small bor-
ough of Minersville, Pennsylvania, Marcus Wayman and a seventeen-
year-old male companion parked their car in the lot adjacent to a lo-
cal beer distributor. 5 The beer distributor had recently been burglar-
ized, so the automobile, with its headlights off, aroused the suspicions
of Minersville police officer F. Scott Wilinsky.6 Wilinsky called for
backup, and Officer Thomas Hoban soon joined him. 7 Though there
were no indications of a break-in at the beer distributor, the officers
approached the car and interrogated the two boys. 8 It was clear that
the students had been drinking alcohol. 9 The officers searched the
vehicle and the boys, believing that they were in possession of mari-
juana, and demanded that the boys empty their pockets.10 Wayman
and his companion complied, at which time the officers discovered
that the boys were carrying condoms.1 1 What happened next is un-
clear. Officer Wilinsky testified that after further questioning the
teens admitted to the officers that they were gay and planning on en-
gaging in sexual relations. 12 Wayman's companion testified other-
wise, however, claiming that the boys never indicated a plan to have
consensual intercourse. 13 Instead, according to Wayman's compan-
1 Victoria Scanlan Stefanakos, Death WithoutJustice, ADVOCATE, Dec. 25, 2001, at 32.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 Id.
5 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Mother Can Take Police to Court Over Son's
Suicide (Nov. 7, 2000), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/re-
cord?record=740 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
11 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 192.
12 Id.; see Brief for Appellants at 6, Sterling (No. 94-1768), available at 2000 WL
33982455.
13 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 192; Mother Settles Lawsuit Against Police Over Suicide of Teenage
Son, MtAMI HERALD, Sept. 14, 2003, at 24A [hereinafter Mother Settles Lawsuit].
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ion, the officers jumped to an erroneous conclusion once they found
the condoms. 1 4
The officers arrested Marcus Wayman and his companion for un-
derage drinking and brought them to the Minersville Police Station
for questioning) 5 At the station, Officer Wilinsky lectured the two
boys about the biblical prohibition against homosexuality,1 6 called
them "queers,"'17 and threatened Wayman that if he did not inform his
grandfather that he was gay, Wilinsky would do so himself.', After
Wayman heard this threat, he informed his companion that he was
going to kill himself.1 9 Indeed, upon his release from police custody
later that night, and on the heels of Wilinsky's threats, Wayman took
the only path that he saw fit at the time-he took his own life.20 Way-
man's fear of public outing was well-founded; the police officers later
forced Wayman's seventeen-year-old companion to tell his mother
that he was gay.2 1
Marcus Wayman's tragic suicide prompted his mother, Madonna
Sterling, to file a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the officers, the police department, and the Borough of Mi-
nersville. 22 The basis of Ms. Sterling's civil rights claim was that the
police officers unconstitutionally deprived Marcus Wayman of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy when they threatened to
"out" him to his family.23 Following discovery, the defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, claiming that they were immune from
suit.2 4 The district court denied summary judgment, ruling that the
doctrine of qualified immunity did not protect the officers. 25 On in-
terlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit, the defendants challenged the
qualified immunity ruling.26 The Third Circuit found that the officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to privacy in
14 See Mother Settles Lawsuit, supra note 13, at 24A.
15 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 192.
16 See id. at 192-93; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Pennsylvania Town
Must Pay $100,000 for Threatening to Tell Teen's Family He Was Gay (Sept. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter ACLU Press Release], at http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/Lesbian-
GayRights.cfm?ID=13577&C=106 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
17 See Marieclaire Dale, Lawsuit Over Teen-ager's Suicide Raises Issue of Gays and Privacy,
LEuAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 6, 2001, at 4.
18 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 193.
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 See New Trial Ordered in Suit Over Teen's Suicide, PENN. L. WKLY., July 1, 2002, at 6.
22 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 193.
23 Id. Sterling's complaint also alleged that the officers and the Borough of Miners-
villc violated Wayman's Fourth Amendment right against illegal arrest, his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection, and the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. For a discussion of the immunity doctrine as it relates to outing claims, see infra
Part II.E.
20 Sterling, 232 F.3d at 193.
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personal information, including sexual orientation, was a clearly es-
tablished constitutional right at the time of the incident.2 7
When the case went to trial, the jury found that the officers were
not liable for any wrongdoing. 28 In a twenty-three page opinion, how-
ever, U.S. Magistrate Judge Arnold C. Rapoport set aside the verdict,
stating that he was "convinced that the weight of the evidence in this
case is against the defendants. '29 While the new trial was pending, the
parties settled the dispute for a mere $100,000.-1
This unsettling case raises important questions about the reme-
dial scheme available to victims of public outings, threats of disclo-
sure, and forced disclosures of sexual orientation. Victims of forced
disclosure or the threat of disclosure by government officials are not
without legal recourse; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for consti-
tutional violations of this sort. The question, however, is how courts
compensate victims or families in a case like Sterling. While the Sterling
Court expressly held that people injured by government officials who
threaten to reveal their sexual orientation are entitled to damages
under federal law,3 ' the court offered no guidance for the lower
courts about how to fashion a remedy in the event that plaintiffs even-
tually prevailed on the merits. Thus, the holding in Sterling may have
established a constitutional right, but the recent settlement between
Madonna Sterling and the Borough of Minersville prevented the
court from reaching the more complicated question of damages and
how they should be calculated in such a case.
This Note focuses on the application of § 1983 to instances of
outing, threats of outing, or forced disclosure of sexual orientation by
public officials. Part I provides background on the Third Circuit deci-
sion in Sterling v. Borough of Minersville and discusses the broad reme-
dial scheme for other constitutional tort claims brought under § 1983.
Part II analyzes each of the requirements of a prima facie constitu-
tional tort claim for public outing, highlighting particular hurdles
unique to cases of this kind. In addition to the duty, breach, actual
injury, and causation requirements, Part II discusses how official im-
munity insulates many possible defendants from suit under § 1983.
27 Id. at 197-98.
28 See New Trial Ordered in Suit Over Teen's Suicide, supra note 21, at 16.
29 See Shannon P. Duffy, New Trial Ordered in Suit Over Man's Suicide, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, June 27, 2002, at 1.
30 See Elliott Grossman, Minersville Suicide Case is Settled, MORNING CALL (Allentown,
Pa.), Sept. 12, 2003, at B1. Rather than prolong the litigation, Madonna Sterling instead
opted for closure, accepting a settlement far less than she may have desired. See id. The
insurance company that was paying out the settlement for the borough was struggling fi-
nancially-this was perhaps the impetus for settlement. See id. The police department has
never officially admitted to any wrongdoing. See id.
31 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196 (stating that "Wayman's sexual orientation was an inti-
mate aspect of his personality entitled to privacy protection").
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Part III of this Note explores the possible damages available to injured
parties and discusses the probability of a successful claim for each.
Part IV discusses the future of recovery for public outing, and suggests
litigation strategies and policy approaches to facilitate analysis under
§ 1983.
I
STERLING v. BOROUGH OF MINERSVILLE
A. The First Barrier to Recovery: Establishing a Constitutional
Claim for Forced Disclosure Under § 1983
The Supreme Court first established the right to privacy in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,3 2 which expanded explicit constitutional protec-
tions to include a right to privacy in intimate associations, including
the "intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician." 3
Over the next several years, the Court extended this right to privacy to
include the right to choose whom to marry,3 4 the right to terminate a
pregnancy,35 and the right to define family living arrangements with-
out government intrusion.36
Before Sterling, the expanding scope of substantive due process
did not include the right to be free from forced disclosures of sexual
orientation. Intuitively, the rights at stake in forced disclosure situa-
tions seem linked to the rights at issue in sodomy-related case law- 7
because both implicate the rights of homosexual individuals. But the
Sterling Court took specific care to distinguish forced disclosure from
sodomy.38 In Bowers v. Hardwick,39 the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that the Constitution confers a "fundamental right to engage
in acts of consensual sodomy. ' 40 The Sterling Court noted that Bowers
was not controlling because the sodomy statute in Bowers regulated
behavior rather than status, an important distinction implicating the
Supreme Court's holding in Robinson v. California.4 1 In Robinson, the
Court found that a California law criminalizing the "status" of a nar-
cotic addiction-that is, an individual could be arrested under this
statute simply because they were addicted to a narcotic drug-violates
32 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33 Id. at 482.
34 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
- See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (invalidating a city
housing ordinance that permitted only certain family members to live together in a single
family dwelling).
37 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
38 See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2000).
-9 478 U.S. 186.
40 Id. at 192.
41 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 42 The Sterling Court
agreed with this distinction. 43 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit-the
only other circuit to rule on unwanted disclosure of sexual orienta-
tion-decided in Walls v. City of Petersburg44 that mandatory disclosure
on a police questionnaire of sexual activities with members of the
same sex did not violate any constitutional right.4 5 The Sterling major-
ity distinguished the facts of that case from Walls and Bowers, which
refused to grant protection to homosexual activity.4 6 The Sterling
Court found Bowers irrelevant because it dealt with homosexual con-
duct rather than homosexual status. 47 Rejecting the logic of Bowers
and Walls, the Sterling Court instead extended the right to informa-
tional privacy48 to forced disclosure of sexual orientation. 49
In Sterling, the court drew an important distinction between the
two branches of the right to privacy. The first branch, implicated in
Bowers and overturned by Lawrence v. Texas,50 is the right to participate
in private activities such as consensual intercourse. 1 The second
branch prohibits disclosure of personal information. 52 The Sterling
Court confined its discussion to the second branch and relied on its
holdings in several related cases to show that informational privacy
can exist in a broad range of matters, including sexual orientation.5 3
The right to informational privacy is the focus of this Note, particu-
larly as it applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It must be acknowledged at the
outset that neither the Supreme Court nor the other circuits have
tested or affirmed the Sterling holding as of yet. In light of the ex-
panding right to privacy suggested by the overruling of Bowers, this
Note treats the Sterling holding as the current law on the issue of
forced disclosures of sexual orientation as applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This presumption of unconstitutionality will allow this Note to focus
42 Id.
43 Sterling, 232 F.3d at 194-95.
44 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cit. 1990).
45 Id. at 193. The Fourth Circuit cited Bowers as controlling precedent, finding that if
there was no protected right to engage in consensual sodomy, there was no bar to a police
questionnaire asking about the applicant's sexual orientation. Id.
46 Lawrence v. Texas reinforces the Sterling holding because it resolves any doubt as to
whether Bowers was controlling precedent. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47 Sterling, 232 F.3d at 194-95.
48 The right to informational privacy is the "right not to have intimate facts concern-
ing one's life disclosed without one's consent." Id. at 195 (quoting Barmicki v. Vopper,
200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999)).
49 See id. at 196 ("Wayman's sexual orientation was an intimate aspect of his personal-
ity entitled to privacy protection.").
5o 539 U.S. at 578.
51 See id.; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
52 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195.
53 Id. at 195-96 (citing Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000); Fraternal Order
of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980)).
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on the second, arguably more perplexing (and not yet analyzed), is-
sue raised by Sterling-the issue of damages.
B. The Second Barrier to Recovery: Proving Damages
Establishing a constitutional violation is only half the battle. In
order to recover, an injured party must also prove that he or she is
entitled to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 provides a
civil remedy for aggrieved parties who have suffered a constitutional
violation at the hands of a public official 5 4 the statute does not set out
any specific remedial structure for courts to determine exactly how to
compensate an injured party. In the absence of any statutorily man-
dated remedial structure, the federal courts have looked to common
law to fill the gaps.5 5 Accordingly, § 1983 claims are often called "con-
stitutional torts" because substantive constitutional rights are wedded
to the remedial structure of tort law.56 The Supreme Court describes
§ 1983 as "creat[ing] 'a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who
are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by
the Constitution. 5 7
Section 1983 actions follow a scheme of common law tort and
have many of the same requirements.58 The court must first deter-
mine whether there was a duty and a breach of that duty.5 9 To satisfy
the duty and breach elements of a constitutional tort claim under
§ 1983, the plaintiff must establish a valid constitutional claim or fun-
damental right and prove that an official has violated that right.60
The Sterling Court concluded that there was indeed a duty-respect
for Marcus Wayman's right to privacy-and a breach of that duty-the
threat to disclose Wayman's orientation to his grandfather. 6 1 Once
the plaintiff establishes an affirmative duty and a breach, the court
must determine if the complainant suffered any actual injury.62 Fi-
54 Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected.., to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in [a] ... proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
55 See Wayne C. Beyer, Police Misconduct: Principles Governing Money Damages and Other
Relief Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 154, 154 (1996); Michael Wells, Constitu-
tional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 157, 158 (1998).
56 See Wells, supra note 55, at 170.
57 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachunan, 424 U.S.
409, 417 (1976)).
58 See Beyer, supra note 55, at 154.
59 See Wells, supra note 55, at 160.
60 Id. at 160-61.
61 See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000).
62 See Beyer, supra note 55, at 154-55.
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nally, the court must ascertain whether there is a causal link between
the actions of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff.6 3
The colorful and extraordinary facts in Sterling may obscure the
difficulties of establishing damages under § 1983. Where the plaintiff
suffers a less tangible harm than in Sterling, such as depression or a
forced resignation from work, § 1983 analysis is murky and often
unmanageable.
There are various environments in which a threat of disclosure
may exist, and in each, courts applying § 1983 encounter several seri-
ous hurdles. For instance, where does the causal chain begin and
end? What kind of injury would suffice for recovery? These questions
highlight the barriers to recovery in § 1983 litigation as applied to
cases of threatened or actual forced disclosure of sexual orientation.
Even if the plaintiff proves a constitutional violation, the actual
damages recoverable under § 1983 wildly vary. Within the framework
of common law tort,64 an aggrieved plaintiff who presents a meritori-
ous constitutional claim may recover either nominal, compensatory,
or punitive damages. 65 If the government official violated a constitu-
tional right but inflicted no actual physical or emotional damages, the
court will award the plaintiff only nominal damages, usually in the
amount of one dollar.66 Where the plaintiff suffered actual, quantifi-
able injury, the court may award compensatory damages. 67 Finally, in
the more egregious cases, where the court sees fit to punish the
wrongdoer, the court may award punitive damages. 68 While this re-
covery scheme seems relatively simple and easy to decipher, in the
context of an outing by a public official, the process of determining
which damages apply is fraught with difficulty.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS FOR PUBLIC OUTING,
THREATS OF OUTING, AND FORCED DISCLOSURE
A. Duty-The "Color of Law" Problem
Before the plaintiff may recover monetary damages in a § 1983
action, he must prove the threshold element required of any constitu-
tional tort: the existence of a duty and a breach of that duty. The
63 Id. at 163.
64 Some scholars believe that constitutional tort and common law tort should be
treated as fundamentally different. See Wells, supra note 55, at 159.
65 See Beyer, supra note 55, at 154-55.
66 See id. at 154; see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 267 & n.24 (1978) (stating that
nominal damages should be available for deprivations of constitutional rights and listing
other courts that have approved such awards).
67 See Beyer, supra note 55, at 154-55.
68 See id. at 155.
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language of § 1983 provides a civil remedy only when there is a depri-
vation of rights "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory."69 The phrase "under color
of' has come to mean that a plaintiff can bring a § 1983 action only
when "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right
[is] fairly attributable to the State." 70 Furthermore, to be held liable,
the defendant must have acted in his official capacity at the precise
time of the act. 71 Thus, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing the
action of some individual or entity, under color of state law, 7 2 and that
this action deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right or a federal
statutory right.73
The Third Circuit held in Sterling that the defendant was not enti-
tled to summary judgment, but did not expressly discuss whether of-
ficers Wilinsky and Hoban acted under color of law.74 The Supreme
Court has previously held, however, that an on-duty police officer, act-
ing in an official capacity (i.e., arresting or processing a suspect), op-
erates under the color of state law.75 Thus, though not explicit, the
holding in Sterling suggests that the Third Circuit believed that the
defendants acted within their official capacity as officers of the law,
thereby satisfying the "color of law" requirement. 76
Marcus Wayman's case is arguably an easy one. As officers of the
law in the course of carrying out an investigation, Wilinsky and Hoban
were undoubtedly state actors. By lecturing Wayman and his compan-
ion against homosexuality and threatening to disclose Wayman's sex-
ual orientation, the officers clearly overstepped the bounds of their
authority. Where the offending party is not a police officer, however,
69 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
70 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (holding that "state action"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment also satisfies the "color of law" requirement
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
71 See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
73 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 4 (1998).
74 Sterling, 232 F.3d at 197.
75 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961); accord Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d
1461, 1464 (10th Cir. 1996).
76 There is some suggestion that Officer Wilinsky may have had a more personal stake
in outing Marcus Waynan. At one point, Wilinsky was the high school football coach. He
was fired from this position shortly before the incident at issue. There is some evidence
that Wilinsky had been seeking revenge on some of the team's players. See Eric Ferrero, A
Mother's Legacy for Her Son: Major Court Ruling Recognizes Rights of Rural Gays, ACLU RuRAL
GAY REPORT, available at http://www.geocities.com/mhc humanrights/Minersvil-
leMother.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). Had this fact surfaced at trial, it is unclear
whether Wilinsky would have been acting under color of state law. See Blair v. City of
Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that acts of misconduct within
the police department directed at another officer who had reported prior misconduct
were "private acts of revenge" and not performed under color of law).
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it is less certain that the plaintiff will be able to satisfy the "color of
law" requirement and recover under § 1983.
The "color of law" problem becomes particularly complex in the
public school environment. Indeed, it is in this environment that
many involuntary disclosures occur. 77 For instance, if a teacher in a
public school determined that a student was gay and threatened to
disclose that fact to others, it is not clear that the teacher would be
acting under color of state law.7 8 In fact, in another § 1983 action, the
Fifth Circuit rejected a claim against a school official because there
was no indication that the school official acted in a public capacity
when carrying out the unconstitutional act.7 9
The threat of outing is a problem that pervades many facets of
life,80 but the threat is particularly pronounced in the school context
given the unique relationship between a student and a teacher.8 1 The
teacher often has a dual role: an educator as well as an emotional
support system for the student.8 2 Given the nature of this relation-
ship, a school official's decision to foist an opinion about homosexual-
ity on a closeted student, threaten to disclose the student's
77 See Press Release, ACLU, Court Rules that Tragic Police Outing of Gay Teen Vio-
lated Constitutional Rights; ACLU Sees Broad Impact (Nov. 7, 2000), at http://
www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRighs/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=8174&C=106 (last visited Jan.
26, 2005) (suggesting that the problem of forced disclosure of sexual orientation impli-
cates "guidance counselors, teachers, clergy, and law enforcement officials").
78 See Smith v. Winter, 782 F.2d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 1986) ("A purely private act is not
considered to be done 'under color of state law merely because the actor is a public
official.").
79 Id.
80 See supra note 77.
81 Although no court has had the opportunity to decide a § 1983 action based on the
improper actions of school teachers or administrators, there is at least one First Amend-
ment case related to involuntary disclosure of sexual orientation. See McLaughlin v. Bd. of
Educ., 296 F. Supp.2d 960 (E.D. Ark. 2003). In that case, a school official outed Thomas
McLaughlin, a fourteen-year-old student atJacksonville Junior High School in Jacksonville,
Arkansas by calling McLaughlin's parents to tell them their son was gay. Id. at 963. Mc-
Laughlin later stated that "[m]y school forced me out of the closet when I should have
been allowed to come out to my family on my own terms and when I thought it was the
right time. And now the school has been trying to shove me back into it ever since."
School officials later forced McI aughlin to read passages from the Bible and disciplined
him for openly discussing his sexuality. Id. The American Civil Liberties Union is cur-
rently representing McLaughlin in his injunctive action against the school in order to pro-
tect his First Amendment right to discuss his sexuality without fear of repercussion. See
Press Release, ACLU: ACLU Warns Arkansas School to Stop Persecuting Gay Student
(Mar. 13, 2003), at http://www.aclu.org/news/newsprint.cfm?ID=12082&c=106 (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2005). Although McLaughlin has not yet filed a § 1983 action, his case exem-
plifies the threat of public outing. Such examples highlight the importance of establishing
a workable § 1983 scheme.
82 At least one commentator suggests that "[tioday's public schools are charged with
both the moral and academic development of our young people." Margaret-Ann F. Howie,
A Student's Constitutional Rights in the Public School Setting, in SWOR) AND SHIELD REviSITSD: A
PRAcIC.AL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983, at 494 (Mary Massaron Ross, ed., 1998).
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orientation, or, worse, actually disclose that information to others, can
have devastating consequences. s 3
While there is a dearth of case law regarding a teacher or admin-
istrator's disclosure of a student's sexual orientation, there is no
shortage of § 1983 cases brought against teachers and administrators
in other contexts.8 4 Under this large body of law, a public school offi-
cial who discloses or threatens to disclose a student's sexual orienta-
tion will only be found to have acted under color of state law if the
official made the disclosure or threat of disclosure while carrying out
official responsibilities.85 Compounding the analytic murkiness of the
school environment, it is unclear whether the actions of a private
school official could ever fulfill the "color of law" requirement of
§ 1983.86 Most courts answer this question in the negative8 7 unless the
state has "insinuated itself' with the school in such a way that it can be
considered a 'joint participant" in the action. 8
83 One need not consider the maliciousness of the act. The teacher, of course, may
be full of good intentions, but the threat of disclosure would nonetheless breach the stu-
dent's right to privacy under Sterling if the teacher knew or should have known the state-
ments violated clearly established law.
84 See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994) (find-
ing that a teacher's sexual misconduct with a student was under color of law where he took
advantage of his position as teacher and coach and where acts in question occurred on
school grounds during school hours); Black ex rel. v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707,
710-11 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a school bus driver was not a state actor for purposes
of a § 1983 action against him); D.T. ex rel. by M.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d
1176 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a teacher who sexually molested students at non-
school activities during the summer vacation was not a state actor and therefore was not
acting under color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 action).
85 In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit took a broad approach to
§ 1983 actions against a school official. 15 F.3d at 452 & n.4. The court, citing the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in D. T., found that if there is a real nexus between the activity out of
which the constitutional violation occurs and the teacher's duties and obligations as a
teacher, the defendant is said to have acted under color of law. Id.
86 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
87 See generally Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 831 (1982) (holding that state funding
and regulation are insufficient to establish state action); McKeesport Hosp. v. Accredita-
tion Council for Grad. Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519 (3d Cir. 1994) (determining that a private
medical school accrediting body was not a state actor even though it derived its power from
a state statute and a state official accompanied private surveyors in each school investiga-
tion); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that state involvement
with regard to financial aid does not turn a private university into a state actor); Logiodice
v. Trustees of Maine Cent. Inst., 170 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that a private
high school funded by a local public school was not a state actor); Morgan v. St. Francis
Prep. Sch., 326 F. Supp. 1152 (C.D. Pa. 1971) (finding no state action in the expulsion of
students at a private preparatory school with no significant financial connection to the
State); Grossner v. Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that neither
receipt of money from the state nor furthering the public interest through education is
sufficient to make a private university into a state actor).
88 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1961); Milonas v.
Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 939-40 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding private school for behaviorally
problematic children was a state actor because the State involuntarily placed students at
the facility).
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B. Breach-The Sterling Precedent
The second element of the complainant's prima facie § 1983
claim is the deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.89
Here, future litigants benefit most from the Sterling holding that the
officers' threats amounted to a serious and actionable deprivation of
the constitutional right to informational privacy. 90 In fact, the court
stated that "Wayman's sexual orientation was an intimate aspect of his
personality entitled to privacy protection." 9' Thus, Sterling is quite
clear that an individual has a broad right to be free from disclosure
without consent of intimate details.92
This right to privacy is certainly not absolute. 9 3 An actor may jus-
tify curtailing the right to privacy by setting forth a "genuine, legiti-
mate, and compelling" state interest in disclosing another's sexual
preference. 94 In Sterling, the defendants offered no state interest, and
the court thus quickly dismissed that defense. 9 5 When Sterling was de-
cided in 2000, the defendants could have argued that morality was a
valid state interest which justified Wilinsky's threat to disclose Way-
man's sexuality.9 6 In the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, however, such a
defense would be unavailing. 97 Absent the morality argument, it
seems unlikely that a defendant would be able to maintain any genu-
ine state interest.98 This analysis highlights Sterling's limitations: in fu-
89 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 73, at 4.
90 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000).
91 Id. at 196.
92 See id. at 195 ("[T]he right not to have intimate facts concerning one's life dis-
closed without one's consent ... is a venerable one whose constitutional significance we
have recognized ... " (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999))).
" See id. at 196 (recognizing that a state interest may be so significant as to override
the right to privacy).
94 Id. (citing Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1141 (3d. Cir.
1995)).
03 5 Id.
96 The morality argument stems from Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
97 Lawrence held that morality was never a sufficiently compelling interest to satisfy
Equal Protection analysis. See 539 U.S. at 578. Although the Supreme Court did not reach
the issue of whether the Texas sodomy law would survive substantive due process analysis,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, expressed confidence that no law of this sort
could pass muster in a democratic society. See id.
98 Some defendants could argue that personal security-that is, gay individuals are
inherently "safer" when part of a group, rather than feeling socially and sexually isolated-
is a significant state interestjustifying disclosure. Cf Warren Friedman, Volunteerism and the
Decline of Violent Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1453, 1464 (1998) (discussing how
individuals in poor communities who work together and engage in "collective efficacy"
create generally safer neighborhoods). It is true that there are often tangible social sup-
port benefits to coming out. See Linda D. Garnets & Anthony R. D'Augelli, Empowering
Lesbian and Gay Communities: A Call for Collaboration with Community Psychology, 22 AM. J.
CMTY. PSYCHOL. 447, 454 (1994). Such benefits, however, are often confined only to urban
or other metropolitan areas where there are specific neighborhoods with large populations
of gays and lesbians and where there is a social network and infrastructure that is support-
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ture § 1983 actions, Sterling can be cited only for the threshold
proposition that an official had and breached a duty. In addition,
Sterling has limited jurisdictional reach-until addressed by other cir-
cuits or the Supreme Court, there may be no constitutional breach of
informational privacy outside of the Third Circuit.
C. Injury-The Problem of Cognizable Harm
An issue closely linked to the determination of damages99 is how
to assess the injury that the state actor inflicted on the aggrieved party.
According to the Supreme Court, "the abstract value of a constitu-
tional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages." 00 Certain
damages are available under § 1983 only if the action caused some
sort of compensable injury. 10 ' Thus, a court must be able to identify
some cognizable injury before the plaintiff may recover,10 2 despite the
difficulty of doing so.
1. Emotional Distress
Although Madonna Sterling could easily make out a case for in-
jury-the death of her son-any variation on the Sterling facts yields
significantly more nebulous results. For instance, if the plaintiff suf-
fers only emotional strain following an official's threats, it is unclear to
what extent there is a compensable injury. As in any tort claim, emo-
tional distress is notoriously difficult to prove.' 03 Integral to any claim
of emotional distress is empirical and physical data tracing the psycho-
logical effects of the challenged acts. In the growing academic dis-
ive and helpful for those recently out of the closet. See id. Therefore, it is unlikely that one
could successfully argue a valid security or community interest because the disclosure of
one's sexual identity in rural locations such as Minersville, Pennsylvania, often does more
harm than good. SeeJames Donald Smith, Working With Larger Systems: Rural Lesbians and
Gays, in RURAL GAYS AND LESBIANS: BUILDING ON THE STRENGTHS OF COMMUNITIES 13-21
(James Donald Smith & Ronald J. Mancoske eds., 1997) (discussing rural gay individuals'
sense of social rejection and internalized homophobia); Gregory M. Here et al., Correlates of
Internalized Homophobia in a Community Sample of Lesbians and Gay Men, 2 J. GAY & LESBIAN
MED. ASs'N 17-25 (1998) (discussing the relationship between gays, self-esteem, and
mental health problems). In fact, disclosure of one's sexual orientation might, in fact,
accomplish the opposite, posing a grave threat to the gay individual's personal safety. For
instance, a recent study measuring the frequency of anti-gay harassment in schools found
that 84% of gay students had been verbally harassed in school, 39% of gay students re-
ported that they had been physically harassed, and 64% stated that they felt unsafe at their
school because of their sexual orientation. GAY, LESBIAN, AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NET-
WORK, THE 2003 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY 12-15 (2004).
99 For a more in-depth discussion of damages, see infra Part III.
100 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).
101 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).
102 See id. at 255.
103 Courts have regarded emotional distress as "too subtle and speculative to be capa-
ble of a measurement by any standard known to the law." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 55 (1941) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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course regarding the psychology of coming out of the closet, 1° 4 the
focus is placed on the voluntary disclosure of sexual orientation, in-
cluding the process, the aftermath, and the effects on loved ones.10 5
There is a growing body of work, however, analyzing the same psycho-
logical effects in the more nuanced area of unwanted outing or forced
disclosure.' 0 6
For many individuals, the threat of forced disclosure means re-
vealing and explaining a facet of life that they have worked very hard
to conceal for many years. 0 7 While much of the gay community
would certainly extol the virtues of coming out, many individuals, par-
ticularly those in rural, conservative, or ethnically or religiously intol-
erant environments, prefer to remain in the closet.'08 For these
individuals, a threat of forced disclosure is even more distressing.'a 9
Individuals who are presently unable to accept and reveal their homo-
sexuality "may suffer serious damage to their self-esteem if forced to
come out before they are ready, and ultimately may retreat even fur-
ther into the closet."1 10 Thus, the emotional strain is undeniably
104 The expression "coming out" or "coming out of the closet" is a colloquialism used
throughout this Note as synonymous with "voluntary disclosure of one's own sexual iden-
tity." I use it here because of the active nature of the verb "to come," suggesting an affirma-
tive step to reveal sexual preference; in contrast, involuntary disclosure does not result in
"coming out of the closet" because there was no affirmative step taken by the individual-it
was an entirely passive and unwanted factual disclosure.
105 See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, Homophobia: In the Closet and in the Coffin, 21 LAw & INEQ.
65 (2003).
106 See, e.g., Susanne M. Stronski Huweiler & Gary Remafedi, Adolescent Homosexuality,
in 45 ADvANCES IN PEDIATRICS 107, 117-20 (Lewis A. Barness et al. eds., 1998) (discussing
the stages of coming out of the closet and how premature disclosure can create emotional
stress).
107 There is evidence that some individuals will never choose to come out of the closet.
See generally Anthony R. D'Augelli et al., Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths and TheirFamilies:
Disclosure of Sexual Orientation and its Consequences, AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, July 1998, at
361-71 (concluding that gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals who assume their families
would react negatively to disclosure choose to remain in the closet).
108 Until recently, many gay men and women chose to keep their sexuality secret be-
cause of the negative consequences of revealing one's sexual orientation. Indeed, the "atti-
tude [was] reinforced by the presence of sodomy laws and widespread social and religious
disapprobation." David H. Pollack, Comment, Forced Out of the Closet: Sexual Orientation and
the Legal Dilemma of "Outing", 46 U. MIaMI L. REV. 711, 717 (1992) (citations omitted).
109 The degree of emotional trauma felt by gay men and women who are not in the
position of being "outed" is very high. In fact, in one survey, one in every four lesbians and
one in every five gay men who responded to the survey attempted suicide at least once.
MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: How AMERICA VILL CONQUER ITS
FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE '90s, at 60 (1989). When asked why they did so, over half
responded that they did so because of the unhappiness they felt about being gay and the
difficulty they experienced trying to fit into a hostile world. See id. Therefore, if the diffi-
culty of fitting into a hostile environment is chief among the psychological concerns of gay
men and women, this fear is only exacerbated by unwanted disclosure of sexual
preference.
110 Pollack, supra note 108, at 721 (citing M. ScoTr PECK, THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED 61
(1978)).
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great. Still, the possible lack of physical symptoms or visible scars
makes it difficult to quantify the harm suffered in order to calculate
damages. 1 '
2. Social and Professional Harm
Injury following unwanted disclosure of sexual orientation may
extend beyond emotional strain to include social and professional
risks.' 1 2 A court entertaining a § 1983 claim should consider the
harm that forced disclosure has on the individual's relationships
within the community, with family, or at school. There are a number
of social and professional harms that may result from an individual's
decision to come out of the closet, including dismissal from a job," 3
an uncomfortable workplace, or even a risk to the gay individual's per-
sonal safety. 114 Involuntary disclosure of a gay person's sexual orienta-
tion only exacerbates these risks.
While these social and professional risks are quite real, the injury
from involuntary disclosure is nonetheless speculative, and few courts
will likely fashion a remedy on the basis of speculative injury.' 15 This
factor is yet another hurdle to recovery in § 1983 cases.
D. Causation-The Proximate Cause Problem
As in common law tort, the plaintiff in a § 1983 action has the
burden of establishing a causal link between the injury and the unlaw-
111 Federal courts can ease the difficulty of quantifying emotional injuries by import-
ing a tort-law structure of presumed damages. See infra Part IV.A. While it may be difficult
to assign a monetary value to this harm, it should pose no greater challenge than quanti-
fying lost life in a wrongful death claim. A jury must decide the precise value of either
form of nonmonetary harm. See generally Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffer-
ing: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L.
REv. 773, 804-05 (1995) (proposing a method for calculating nonmonetary awards by
quantifying how much a reasonable person would pay to eliminate the risk that caused the
injury).
112 This is not pure conjecture. Respondents to a survey gauging the feelings of heter-
osexuals towards homosexuals revealed that 52% stated that they would prefer not to work
with homosexuals, 22% believe it should be completely legal to prevent homosexuals from
taking advantage of job and housing opportunities, 35% admitted that they were uncom-
fortable around gays, and 33% avoid places where gay men and women might be present.
KJRK & MADSEN, supra note 109, at 82.
113 Although many employers have implemented anti-discrimination policies that pre-
vent a supervisor from dismissing an employee solely on the basis of sexual orientation or
the employee's perceived sexual orientation, most still do not have such policies. See
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, RESOURCE GUIDE TO COMING OUT 29 (2004), available at http://
www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Resources2&Template=/ContentManagement/Con-
tentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=22631 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
114 See generally MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, OUTING YOURSELF 137-54 (1995) (warning
that it is crucial to assess the quality and nature of the workplace before coming out of the
closet, as the failure to do so may result in an uncomfortable workplace or even physical
violence).
115 See PROSSER, supra note 103, § 11, at 55.
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ful conduct.' 16 Specifically, the plaintiff "must allege specific, con-
crete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm[ed]
him."' 17 Further, the plaintiff must establish a reasonable causal link
between the defendant's conduct and the constitutional right de-
prived.' I8 Moreover, where this relationship does not exist, the plain-
tiff may not even have standing in federal court in an action against
that defendant. 19
The causal link in Sterling is self-evident. Marcus Wayman left a
note for his grandfather saying: "I'm sorry Grandpa, I found my fu-
ture. I won't let everyone's life be ruined by mine." 120 The last line of
Marcus's note, expressing the fear that disclosure would harm not
only his own life, but the lives of his family, provides a clear causal
connection. In reality, however, most cases probably do not have this
sort of unmistakably expressed statement to satisfy the causal
requirement.
One significant problem in determining causation is establishing
proximate cause. An intervening event in the causal chain of events
destroys proximate cause, 12 1 as does a situation in which the conse-
quences of the constitutional deprivation is wholly unforeseeable.122
For instance, if an officer threatens to disclose an individual's sexual
orientation and then, prior to doing so, a third party reveals the indi-
vidual's sexuality, the initial threat may not be seen as the proximate
cause of the injury.'2 3
116 See, e.g., Dixon v. Burke County, 303 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11 th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the plaintiff failed to meet the causal requirements because she did not establish any link
between the hiring practice and the sexual discrimination).
117 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
118 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109,
1113 (8th Cir. 1999).
119 The causation requirement for standing in federal court itself constitutes an enor-
mous body of law that exceeds the scope of this Note. It is sufficient to point out that the
same causal difficulties arising in a § 1983 claim may, under certain circumstances, prevent
the plaintiff from obtaining standing in federal court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir.
1998); see also M. DAVID GELFAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 1983, § 6-
4(B), at 525 (1996) (discussing Lujan's requirement of "a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of-that is, the injury must be fairly traceable to defen-
dant's actions; it cannot be the result of independent actions by a third party who is not
before the court").
120 See Stefanakos, supra note 1, at 32.
121 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 561 (1st Cir. 1989) ("An
'unforeseen and abnormal' intervention ... breaks the chain of causality, thus shielding
the defendant from [§ 1983] liability." (citation omitted)).
122 See, e.g., Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[A] policy [is] a
proximate cause ... if intervening actions were within the scope of original risk and there-
fore foreseeable." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
123 Cf Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 366 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding in a false imprison-
ment action against a police officer that the causal chain extended only as far as plaintiff's
arraignment, and that any subsequent injuries must be remedied in a separate claim
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In addition, a plaintiff may satisfy the "but-for" test of causation
but fail to establish proximate cause because the consequences were
nonetheless unforeseeable. 124 In this way, a constitutional tort is no
different from a common law tort; the litigant must establish that the
consequences of the violation were foreseeable to the defendant at
the time the defendant acted. 125 This situation could arise where, for
instance, the defendant threatened to disclose the plaintiffs sexuality,
triggering a preexisting depression and a chain of emotional
responses.
Even though the proximate cause requirement allows courts to
analyze constitutional torts in the same way as common law torts,
scholars are split on the question of whether courts should do so. Pro-
fessor Michael Wells suggests that there are different interests at stake
in constitutional tort claims, where more weight is given to the plain-
tiffs interest in recovery and there is a special interest in deter-
rence.1 26 To this end, Professor Wells supports the "weaker proximate
cause limits on liability" that constitutional torts require as opposed to
the more stringent approach of common law tort.
1 27
By contrast, Professor John Jeffries suggests limiting liability for
constitutional torts because the goal of § 1983 is simply to compensate
plaintiff for the wrong perpetrated against them. As Professor Jeffries
sees it, "[i]njury unrelated to the constitutional risk [should] be
against the offending parties); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989) (find-
ing that the intervening acts of the prosecutor, grand jury, judge, and jury broke the chain
of causation that formed the basis of plaintiff's unreasonable seizure claim).
124 See, e.g., Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 107 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that an of-
ficer acting under color of law should only be liable for reasonably foreseeable injuries).
125 As one commentator notes, there is limited Supreme Court guidance on this mat-
ter. SeeWells, supra note 55, at 211. The only case arguably on point, Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980), found that injuries inflicted five months after a parolee's
release can not be attributed to the parole officials in a § 1983 action. See Wells, supra note
55, at 53 n.240. Several lower courts treat this case as one of proximate cause. See, e.g., Van
Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Martinez and holding
that unforeseeable private acts break the proximate cause chain); DorothyJ. v. Little Rock
Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Martinez and finding that an assault on a
mentally retarded student was too remote a consequence of defendant's actions to be fore-
seeable); Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting
Martinez's distinction between state action and proximate cause).
126 Wells, supra note 55, at 212.
127 Id. Wells's theory is that because constitutional torts involve the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the plaintiff's interest in recovery is greater. Id. Furthermore, the
goal of § 1983 actions is to deter future wrongdoing. Id. More exacting proximate cause
standards make this goal harder to achieve. See id. Wells does not contend, however, that
courts eliminate proximate cause entirely from constitutional tort analysis. He simply sug-
gests "putting a thumb on the scales in the plaintiff's favor." Id. Wells endorses the ap-
proach taken by the Second Circuit in Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, 115
F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997). See Wells, supra note 55, at 212-13. Under this approach, be-
cause the defendant could not have foreseen the plaintiffs emotional fragility, he would
not be held liable for plaintiff's depression-or the resulting consequences. Warner, 115
F.3d at 1071 (citing Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 561 (1st Cir. 1989)).
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treated as all the other myriad harms that result from government
action-as a necessary cost of living in an organized society."' 2 8 Jef-
fries argues that, when a plaintiff suffers a harm different from that
which the constitutional provision aims to prevent, the § 1983 recov-
ery scheme breaks down.12 9
Jeffries's approach raises specific problems for recovery in disclo-
sure of sexual orientation cases. Substantive due process, however
conceived, 130 was not intended to protect individuals from the specu-
lative injuries associated with disclosure. Rather, the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents states from depriving "any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of the laws." 13 1 Under the Jeffries
approach, if the plaintiffs injury-emotional distress, for example-is
unrelated to the explicit textual protections of the Constitution, the
plaintiff will be unable to establish proximate cause. If federal courts
adopt this standard of proximate cause, future litigants in forced dis-
closure cases would have little chance to recover damages for their
injuries.
E. Immunity-The Qualified or Absolute Immunity Problem
A § 1983 claim may also raise the question of whether a defen-
dant is entitled to qualified or absolute immunity.' 32 The Supreme
Court employs a "functional approach" in its immunity analysis, "ex-
amin [ing] the nature of the functions with which a particular official
or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and ... seek[ing] to
evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would
likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions."'13 3 Using
this approach, the Court answers the immunity question not accord-
ing to the title or position that the defendant holds, but by examining
the nature of the defendant's actions.' 3 4 The Court will offer absolute
immunity to a government official performing an official act, regard-
128 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury
in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REv. 1461, 1484 (1989).
129 Id. at 1481. Jeffries offers the following hypothetical example: Suppose that A owns
and operates an adult bookstore that has peep shows, where patrons can pay money to see
a live nude sex show. The town shuts down the operation, invoking an unconstitutionally
broad zoning ordinance that prevents "live entertainment." A suffers great economic loss.
His injury, the economic loss, is not the sort of injury that the First Amendment is meant to
prevent, so A should not recover. Id.
1350 See generally Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of Substantive Due Process,
21 RUTGERs L.J. 537, 539-43 (1990) (offering a broad overview of the Supreme Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence).
131 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1 2 See Robert F. Brown, Individual Immunity Defenses Under § 1983, in SwoRD & SHIELD
REvISITED: A PRAc-ricAL APPROACH TO SECrION 1983, supra note 82, at 510, 513.
133 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
1-14 See Brown, supra note 132, at 514.
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less of whether the act is constitutional or legal. 135 On the other
hand, if the government official is performing a discretionary func-
tion, the official is entitled to qualified immunity only if "the[ ] con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."1 36
In analyzing Officer Wilinsky's qualified immunity claim, the Ster-
ling Court first had to "determine if the plaintiff has alleged a depriva-
tion of a clearly established constitutional right."'3 7 If a violation
exists, a defendant does not have a claim of qualified immunity if "the
unlawfulness of the action would have been apparent to a reasonable
official."13 8  Based on this framework, the Sterling Court had no
trouble finding that Wilinsky was not entitled to qualified immunity
because he "could not reasonably have believed that his questioned
conduct was lawful in light of the established law protecting privacy
rights."l3 9
Dissenting in Sterling, Judge Stapleton argued that Wilinsky's con-
duct was not contrary to clearly established law.' 40 The dissent cited
Walls v. City of Petersburg,14 the only prior case to discuss the privacy
interest in sexual orientationI 42 -a case in which the Fourth Circuit
held that there was no constitutionally protected right to privacy in
one's sexual orientation. 43 In light of Walls, the dissent believed that
Wilinsky was entitled to qualified immunity from suit.1 4 4
135 Id.
136 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Prior to Harlow, qualified immunity
analysis embodied both an objective (reasonable grounds for the defendant to believe the
conduct was lawful) and subjective (defendant's belief in good faith) component. See
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416'U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). Hartow eliminated the good faith test
altogether. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. At least one scholar has argued that the elimina-
tion of the subjective component is due to the often high costs of § 1983 actions. See
Michael T.G. Long, Comment, The Replying Game: Making the Case for Adopting the Fifth Cir-
cuit's Use of Particularized Replies in § 1983 Actions, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 389, 409 (2003)
(noting that the good faith analysis inevitably yielded a "genuine issue [of] material fact,"
which prevented summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)). Costs
of litigation are certainly a concern for the position taken in this Note, which advocates an
expansive view of § 1983 in order to establish coverage for disclosure claims. Judicially
crafted remedial structures in hard-to-prove constitutional tort claims can further alleviate
these costs. See infra Part [V.A.
137 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 193 (3d Cir. 2000).
138 Id. (citing Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1999)).
139 Id. at 198. The court did not care that the action had not previously been held
unlawful. See id. It reached this conclusion because the nature of the information was
clearly private and confidential and because the broad right to privacy itself is well-settled.
Id.
140 Id. (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
141 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
142 See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 198 (Stapleton, J., dissenting),
143 Walls, 895 F.2d at 193.
144 Sterling, 232 F.3d at 198 (Stapleton,J., dissenting).
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Because the Supreme Court has not resolved the Sterling-Walls
split, a defendant may still raise qualified immunity as a defense in
other circuits. The possible applicability of both absolute and quali-
fied immunity to § 1983 actions poses an enormous hurdle to recov-
ery. In addition, while Officer Wilinsky was not able to assert
immunity as a defense, other situations of forced disclosure might per-
mit such a defense even in the Third Circuit. For example, suppose
that a teenager involved in a bitter custody dispute between his par-
ents tells the judge in camera that he is gay in an effort to explain why
he would rather live with one parent as opposed to the other. If the
judge reveals this information during the proceedings, to explain why
he awards custody to one parent over the other, the teen will not be
able to assert a § 1983 claim against the judge because judges are im-
mune from suits of this kind.1 45 As a result of the immunity doctrine,
and the unsettled (or, rather, not yet "clearly established"'146) state of
the law on informational privacy, plaintiffs in § 1983 actions may not
be able to recover from a sizable number of potential defendants.
III
TYPES OF DAMAGES AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO FORCED
DISCLOSURE, THREATS OF OUTING, AND ACTUAL
PUBLIC OUTING
A. Compensatory Damages
On September 10, 2003, Madonna Sterling settled her claim
against the Borough of Minersville and Officers Wilinsky and Hoban
for $100,000.147 Ms. Sterling's decision to settle the case ended the
ordeal, but assured that the lower court would never reach the com-
plex question of damages. Had the litigation continued, the court
would have addressed the question of what damages an aggrieved
party can recover for a threatened disclosure of private information.
145 Judges have absolute immunity by virtue of common law and the Civil Rights Act of
1871. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (exemptingjudges from civil
liability for judicial acts). The Supreme Court recognized absolute judicial immunity for
damages under § 1983 in Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) ("[T]he immunity of
judges for acts within thejudicial role is... well established, and we presume that Congress
would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine [when it enacted
§ 1983]."). Absolute judicial immunity has only two limitations; both acts taken in clear
absence of a court's jurisdiction (although immunity does extend to acts that are in mere
excess ofjurisdiction) and non-judicial acts do not receive protection. See Stump v. Spark-
man, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); Brown, supra note 132, at 519. Although judges do not
enjoy absolute immunity for administrative or executive authority (as opposed to judicial
authority), they are still afforded qualified immunity for their acts in those capacities. See
Long, supra note 136, at 407. In the hypothetical example presented above, the judge is
clearly acting within his judicial capacity and within the bounds of the court's jurisdiction;
thus, he is entitled to absolute immunity.
146 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
147 See supra note 30.
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This section addresses the remedial framework that a court of law
would encounter had Sterling's suit continued and then considers the
merits of a claim for each type of damages.
Courts award compensatory damages in common law tort cases in
order to compensate plaintiffs for injuries resulting from a defen-
dant's breach of some duty owed to the plaintiff.148 Federal courts
have followed the common law in § 1983 procedural and substantive
due process claims.' 49 Unlike common law tort claims, however, con-
stitutional tort claims rarely involve physical injury, making "tangible
damages" relatively small.1 50 Therefore, it is difficult in constitutional
tort cases to quantify the harm in order to determine how to make an
injured party whole through compensatory damages.
As discussed above, 15 1 perhaps the most difficult harm to quantify
for purposes of a § 1983 action is emotional distress. This difficulty
stems from the fact that "[e]motional harms are unquantifiable, irra-
tional, inconsistent, and not easily subjected to a cause and effect anal-
ysis [and] . . . [ojur system of jurisprudence tends to be concerned
with quantifiable, rational, consistent and predictable results."' 52 Yet,
an emotional response is the most likely harm to result from the
threat of or actual disclosure of one's sexual orientation. 15 3 These
measurement problems ensure that the emotional distress associated
with disclosure of sexual orientation is not likely to be a compensable
injury in a § 1983 claim.1 54
Few constitutional tort claimants are successful in establishing
compensable emotional distress claims,155 and, where successful, the
plaintiffs recovery is often small. 15 6 Perhaps this trend can be fairly
attributed to the judicial fear that recognizing compensatory damages
for emotional distress would "open the floodgates of litigation, giving
148 See generally Wells, supra note 55, at 214 (discussing the damages associated with the
common law torts).
149 See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1986) (finding
that the complainant is only entitled to quantifiable damages based on actual injuries suf-
fered by the deprivation of substantive due process); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67
(1978) (holding that if the complainant's procedural due process claim succeeds, on re-
mand the complainant should recover only nominal damages).
150 See Wells, supra note 55, at 215-16. The exceptions, of course, are cases like Ster-
ling, in which the constitutional violation results in more serious harm, such as loss of life.
151 See supra Part II.C.1.
152 Deborah K. Hepler, Providing Creative Remedies to Bystander Emotional Distress Victims:
A Feminist Perspective, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 71, 78-79 (1993) (citation omitted).
153 See Wells, supra note 55, at 215-16.
154 See supra Part I1.C.1.
155 See, e.g., Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1996); Keenan v. City of Philadel-
phia, 983 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1992).
156 See Coleman, 87 F,3d at 1507 (awarding only $10,000 for the emotional distress asso-
ciated with a sex discrimination claim).
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rise to liability grossly disproportionate to wrongdoing."157 According
to feminist theory, the perceived gendered nature of emotional dis-
tress claims as "'subjective' and 'intangible,' which trivializes and
marginalizes them[,]" makes courts less likely to award damages.' 58
Regardless of the justification, without constitutional tort reform, a
court is unlikely to award damages in a new and controversial § 1983
action for violation of informational privacy. 159 Indeed, the Supreme
Court indicated in Carey v. Piphus that "although mental and emo-
tional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is
compensable under § 1983 .... neither the likelihood of such injury
nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding com-
pensatory damages. 1 60 Even in the substantive due process claim es-
tablished by Sterling, the court appeared to be providing a
constitutional right without a related remedy.161
B. Punitive Damages
In more extreme cases, when a court sees fit to punish an official
for their wrongdoing, it may award plaintiffs punitive damages in their
§ 1983 actions. 162 Courts award punitive damages only where the de-
fendant was "motivated by evil motive or intent, or when [the defen-
dant's act] involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others.' 63 Punitive damages hold particular value
in forced disclosure cases because they are available when a defendant
maliciously violates the plaintiff's constitutional rights, but the plain-
tiff is unable to prove a compensable injury.' 6 4
157 Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772,
814 (1985).
158 See Hepler, supra note 152, at 80.
159 See infra Part W.A.
160 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978).
161 In cases in which the plaintiff has established a constitutional violation but there is
no cognizable injury to remedy, the courts will often award nominal damages, typically in
the amount of one dollar. See id. at 267. It is irrelevant that a court may view a particular
substantive due process as a particularly important one. Since compensatory damages seek
to compensate the plaintiff for actual injuries, the damages in such a case will not be any
higher. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) ("[D]amages
based on the abstract 'value' or 'importance' of constitutional rights are not a permissible
element of compensatory damages in [§ 1983] cases.").
162 See, e.g., King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that compensatory
damages are available even in absence of compensatory damages); Hollins v. Powell, 773
F.2d 191, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing the use of punitive damages in § 1983
actions).
163 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
164 See DAVID W. LEE, 2004 HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 10.02[A] (2004);
see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (granting punitive damages in a case
brought on behalf of deceased federal prisoner for Eighth Amendment violation); Davis v.
Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding a jury award of punitive
damages in a police brutality case).
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While punitive damages are theoretically available in claims for
forced disclosure, recovering punitive damages is difficult.165 Even
though there is some indication that Officer Wilinsky harbored mali-
cious intent toward Marcus Wayman, 16 6 this is not always going to be
the case-particularly because many individuals believe that involun-
tarily disclosing another's sexual orientation is helpful. 167 For exam-
ple, anti-homosexual sentiment is often linked to religious beliefs,1 68
so potential defendants with strong religious convictions may believe
that an individual's sexual orientation should be revealed for religious
reasons, without harboring any malicious or evil intent.169 In these
cases, the plaintiff bears the burder of proving that the defendant
manifested some reckless or callous indifference to the protected
right to privacy. 70 This has not yet been challenged in a § 1983 ac-
tion, and it remains to be seen how the courts would respond to such
a claim. Therefore, punitive damages will most likely be available only
in disclosure cases where the defendant has no reason to divulge the
information other than his pure distaste for homosexuality.
165 There is another hurdle to recovering punitive damages in § 1983 cases. While
§ 1983 does apply to municipalities, complainants may not recover punitive damages from
them. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1981) (comment-
ing that "Uludicial disinclination to award punitive damages against a municipality has
persisted to the present day"). Even outside the context of § 1983 actions, most jurisdic-
tions do not award punitive damages against municipalities. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.18a (3d rev. ed. 1977).
166 See supra note 76.
167 See Pollack, supra note 108, at 720. Pollack suggests that there is some benefit to
outing people-specifically because "it helps to combat the false myths and stereotypes
many heterosexuals have about gay people." Id. In the context of politicians and celebri-
ties, one scholar believes that "outing presupposes that all [people] who engage in prima-
rily homosexual conduct.., owe a minimum obligation to gay society ... to come out" of
the closet. Gabriel Rotello, Out of the Closet & Into the Fray: Should Gay Politicians and Celebri-
ties be Forced to -Come Out?", ON THE ISSUES, Fall 1990, at 23.
168 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A jurisprudence of "Coming Out". Religion, Homo-
sexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411
(1997) (discussing the similarities and differences between sexual orientation and religion
and analyzing the nature of the conflict between advocates on both sides).
169 Notwithstanding the grudge that Officer Wilinsky may have had toward the Miners-
ville football team, see supra note 76, there is a serious and credible argument that Wilinsky
quoted scripture, see New Trial Ordered in Suit Over Teen's Suicide, supra note 21, at 16, and
may have believed that he was helping "cure" Marcus of his homosexuality. Incidentally,
there are several biblical passages that are often cited for the proposition that homosexual-
ity is wrong. For instance, one passage reads: "Thou Shalt not lie with mankind, as with
womankind; it is abomination." Leviticus 18:22 (King James); see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 38 (1980).
170 See LEE, supra note 164, § 10.02[A].
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IV
THE FUTURE OF § 1983 OUTING CLAIMS
A. Suggested Approaches to § 1983 Claims
The Sterling Court conquered the first hurdle to recovery for
forced disclosure by establishing a constitutional cause of action.
That holding, however, is only half the battle. This Note has argued
that each step of the § 1983 analysis is wrought with troubling and
potentially fatal barriers. 17 1 In order for Sterling to provide a right with
a remedy, rather than a noncompensable right, courts must reform
the scope and depth of constitutional tort analysis.
First, in order to provide a more adequate remedy to plaintiffs
who endure the threat of disclosure or actual disclosure, the lower
courts should adopt a system of presumed damages. Presumed dam-
ages are a concept derived from tort law1 72 and are applicable in cases
with particularly intangible damages.' 7 3 In essence, when the plaintiff
suffers injuries that are hard to quantify, the court instructs the jury
that it may presume damages and allow recovery even without proof
of harm. 174 This suggestion is not a novel one for constitutional tort
claims. The Supreme Court's holding in Memphis Community School
District v. Stachura left open the possibility that presumed damages
would be available in limited situations of non-monetary harm.1 75
The analytic framework for implementing a presumed damages
scheme in forced disclosure cases already exists. Typically, presumed
damages are available in tort claims aimed at protecting the personal
dignity of the plaintiff, such as assault, battery, malicious prosecution,
and invasion of privacy.'76 The ever-growing overlap between tort and
constitutional law suggests importing this standard of presumed dam-
ages into § 1983 claims with intangible damages.' 7 7 The only way to
171 See supra Part II.A (the "color of law" problem); Part II.C.1 (the emotional distress
problem); Part II.D (the proximate cause problem); Part lI.E (the immunity problem). It
is important to remember that Sterling came about as an appeal from a denial of summary
judgment. See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 193 (3d Cir. 2000). The
merits of the § 1983 action were not entirely discussed.
172 Traditionally, at common law, courts used presumed damages for privacy and defa-
mation torts, without reference to actual pecuniary harm. 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621
cmt. a (1938) ("It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove any specific harm to his reputa-
tion or any other loss caused thereby"); 4 id., § 867 cmt. d (1939) (noting that damages are
available for privacy torts "in the same way in which general damages are given for defama-
tion" without proof of "pecuniary loss [or] physical harm").
173 See Wells, supra note 55, at 217.
174 Id.
17 The Stachura court would not allow damages to be presumed unless there was a
nonmonetary harm that could not be quantified. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311 (1986). This is true of forced disclosure cases where the injury
would not likely be imonetary in nature.
176 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.3(1), at 302-03 (2d ed. 1993).
177 See Wells, supra note 55, at 217.
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assure that parties will be made whole through § 1983 litigation for
deprivation of informational privacy is to infuse a system of presumed
damages into constitutional tort analysis.
Second, for the reasons laid out above, a more liberal under-
standing of proximate causation is necessary if future litigants in
forced disclosure cases are to have any chance of recovery for the
threat of public outing or forced disclosure of sexual orientation.
Under the permissive standard set forth in Warner v. Orange County
Department of Probation,178 a plaintiff can meet the causation require-
ment even where there is some reasonably foreseeable intervening
force, including the acts of third parties.179 For instance, even if Mar-
cus Wayman had a preexisting clinical depression stemming from his
homosexuality,'8 0 Wilinsky would still be liable for Wayman's injuries
because it was foreseeable that his statements would result in some
sort of harm to the vulnerable teen. This standard ensures that courts
will not bar aggrieved parties from recovery simply because the emo-
tional stress of sexual disclosure was not the harm envisioned when
the Due Process Clause was written. 181
Third, courts should permit punitive awards more liberally in
claims of forced disclosure. One goal of § 1983 is to deter future
wrongdoing by government officials.18 2 Plaintiffs should not be left to
collect only nominal damages if they fail to establish actual, compen-
satory damages. When a plaintiff receives only nominal damages for
egregious wrongdoing, there is nothing preventing state actors from
committing similarly homophobic acts in the future. Instead, a court
employing a liberal punitive scheme could more adequately deter fu-
ture wrongdoing by government officials. 1 3 This analytic structure, if
178 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997).
179 Id. at 1071 (citing Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 561 (lst Cir.
1989)).
180 There was some evidence supporting the assertion that Marcus was suffering from
depression. See Elliot Grossman, Defense Can't Present "Alternative" Scenario: Minersville Teen's
Suicide is Basis of Lawsuit Brought by His Mother, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Nov. 7,
2001, at BI. The defendants attempted to introduce evidence of Wayman's depression
through the testimony of a psychologist who had analyzed Wayman's mental health and
school records. Id. The Magistrate judge blocked this testimony, claiming the testimony
was irrelevant because Wayman's mental health problems occurred long before the inci-
dent. Id. Indeed, the percentage of gay teens that suffer from clinical depression is stag-
geringly high. See Robert Garafolo et al., The Association Between Health Risk Behaviors and
Sexual Orientation Among a School-Based Sample of Adolescents, 101 PEDIATRICS 895, 895 (1998).
A court would still be required to assess whether Wayman's injuries were the foreseeable
consequence of the defendants' actions.
181 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
182 See Beyer, supra note 55, at 155.
183 See generally Wells, supra note 55, at 221 (arguing that a liberal use of punitive dam-
ages would remedy the shortcomings of the common law compensatory damages
structure).
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followed by a federal court, would afford future plaintiffs a legitimate
opportunity at a sizable monetary recovery under § 1983.
B. Policy Suggestions and Litigation Strategies
Some scholars suggest that aggrieved plaintiffs should utilize the
common law tort system as the exclusive source for their monetary
recovery. 184 There are three significant problems with this suggestion.
First, there may be no direct common law analogue to a § 1983 claim
for threats of or actual disclosure of sexual orientation. If there is
actual disclosure, a plaintiff may bring suit for invasion of privacy.'8 5
If the plaintiff has a specific and cognizable emotional injury, he may
allege an intentional infliction of emotional distress. 186 Most claims,
however, fall plainly outside these discrete categories. Moreover, a
plaintiff could not bring a defamation claim unless the official's dis-
closure of his homosexuality was factually untrue. 18 7 Therefore, plain-
tiffs may be left without a cause of action unless the facts neatly fit into
one of these tort claims.
Second, from a systemic standpoint, the rationales behind § 1983
actions and common law tort claims differ. A § 1983 action contem-
plates not only that the defendant acted wrongfully, but that he did so
in violation of a constitutional right. Conversely, a common law tort
claim is typically rooted solely in plaintiff's desire for monetary re-
dress. While a common law tort claim might provide the litigant with
financial compensation, the court would not declare the defendant's
behavior unconstitutional. Although a declaration that the defen-
dant's acts were unconstitutional may not provide the plaintiff with
much solace, it serves a symbolic dignitary function.
Lastly, forcing plaintiffs to sue solely through the common law
tort system-thus focusing to a large extent on the harm suffered-
suggests that the plaintiffs are shamed or embarrassed by their sexual
orientation. When plaintiffs sue because officials disclose truthful in-
formation about their orientation, the suit implies that the plaintiffs
are embarrassed by the information disclosed.188 Allowing plaintiffs
to maintain a constitutional tort claim helps focus the courts' analysis
184 Some argue that there is an inherent tension between constitutional tort actions
and common law tort actions brought in state courts. Both claims may permit recovery for
the exact same injury and allowing both may be redundant. This is doubly confounding
when one considers that the standard is functionally the same for most constitutional tort
and common law tort actions. See, e.g., Jamcs J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Indi-
vidual Remedy, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 393, 406 (2003).
185 See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965).
186 See id. § 46.
187 See Ingrid Schfipbach Martin, The Right to Stay in the Closet: Information Disclosures by
Government Officials, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 407, 441 (2002).
188 See id. at 444.
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on the constitutionality of the defendant's acts, minimizing the
shame-factor highlighted by the tort process. Although a complainant
would still be required to demonstrate harm, bringing suit under
§ 1983 for a violation of a basic constitutional guarantee seems to re-
duce the notion that their orientation is shameful or embarrassing.
Therefore, unless the plaintiff is seeking solely financial redress,
future litigants should utilize § 1983 as a more sweeping remedy to
threats of disclosure and actual disclosure of sexual orientation.
CONCLUSION
Despite the problems inherent in any § 1983 action, Sterling
should not be disregarded as an irrelevant federal decision that has
little, if any, value for future litigants. Instead, the tenets the Third
Circuit declared should be heralded as ushering in a new age in which
individuals have an unfettered right to privacy in their own sexual ori-
entation. The full significance of the holding remains to be seen.
The court did not have the opportunity to test the merits of the com-
plete § 1983 claim, and it is unclear how other courts will handle simi-
lar claims in the future. Though Americans are becoming
increasingly comfortable with their own sexual orientation, cases in-
volving forced disclosure are still likely, as evidenced by the most re-
cent outing of GOP officials supporting the Federal Marriage
Amendment. 18 9 In fact, these are not isolated and unrelated inci-
dents. Instead, these incidents bring to light a difficult and problem-
atic situation facing a large number of closeted gay men and women
across the country.
Given the importance of the right, it is necessary that the court
fashion an appropriate and workable remedy. Of course, the best so-
lution is for public officials to carry out their work in tolerant and
accepting ways, avoiding future forced disclosure suits altogether.
Short of this idealistic solution, however, the courts should make a
remedy available to aggrieved parties under § 1983. The purpose of
§ 1983 is not only to right constitutional wrongs, but also to deter pub-
lic officials from committing similar acts in the future. In order to
serve these dual purposes, § 1983 actions for disclosure and
threatened disclosure of sexuail orientation must survive despite the
189 The most recent example of public outing occurred in the wake of the proposed
Federal Marriage Amendment, which would effectively prohibit homosexual marriages. In
the heated environment that the proposed amendment engendered, many gay activists
and GOP opponents sought to "out" GOP staffers to undermine the party's amendment
momentum. The outing of various Capitol Hill staffers is yet another example of public
outing and reinforces the need to reconsider the statutory remedy for those victims. See
Stefen Styrsky, Outing on Capitol Hill Stirs Debate, GAY Crrv NEWS, July 1-7, 2004, available at
http://gaycitynews.com/gcn-327/outingoncapotolhill.html (last visitedJan. 26, 2005). In-
deed, at least one harassment complaint has been filed in the matter. Id.
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many barriers that exist. To that end, the federal district courts hear-
ing § 1983 actions should take a liberal approach to disclosure suits, as
"it is difficult to imagine a more private matter than one's
sexuality." 190
190 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).
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